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STUDENT NOTE
APPLICABILITY TO STATES OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION
SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS
Washington State offered to sell timber from state school lands
to the highest bidder. The congressional enabling act and the state
constitution provided that these lands be sold at "public sale" and
"not be sold except to the highest bidder." The state commissioner
of public lands at a public action received a bid of $86,335.39 from
a pulp lumber company for timber. The price administrator, relying
on the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 informed the company
that its bid exceeded the ceiling price and if it paid such price it would
be prosecuted. In another suit the state supreme court held that the
Emergency Price Control Act did not apply to state sale of timber
from school lands. The price administrator sued in the federal court
to enjoin the state commission of public lands and the highest bidder
from completing the sale at a price above the ceiling. The district
court held for defendant. The circuit court of appeals reversed and
the supreme court granted certiorari. Held, that the Emergency Price
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Control Act was operative to limit the price at which the state could
sell. Judgment affirmed.-
The state's main contention was that congress did not intend the
act to apply to the states. Two other arguments were also advanced,
one merely a facet of the interpretatioii question. The other, that the
Tenth Amendment prevented such action by the Federal Govern-
ment, was rather hopeless in view of the Court's attitude toward that
Amendment.2 The graver argument revolved around interpretation
of the word "person" as used in the act,3 on the ground on which the
state court4 had held against the price administrator and on which
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented.2
The application of a general statute to the states where the in-
tent of congress is not express has long occupied the Supreme Court
with several tests suggested but none uniformly applied. It has been
said, in interpreting regulatory statutes, that "this Court has dis-
favored inroads by implication on state authority and resolutely con-
fined restrictions upon traditional power of states to regulate their
local transactions to the plain mandate of Congress."6 Lately a differ-
ent turn has apparently been taken in California v. United States7 de-
claring that "the crucial question is whether the statute, read in the
light of the circumstances that gave rise to its enactment and for
which it was designed, applies also to public owners" ' with which the
statement in the principal case that "Excessive prices for rents or
1 Case v. Bowles, 327 U. S. 92, 66 S. Ct. 438, 90 L. ed. 552 (1946).
2 Darby v. United States, 312 U. S. 100, 124, 61 S. Ct. 451, 462, 85 L. ed.
609, 622 (1940) (The Amendment (10th) states but a truism that all is retained
which has not been surrendered).
359 STAT. 302(h) (1942), 50 U. S. C. A. §942(h) (1944) ("The term
'person' includes an individual, corporation, partnership, association or any other
organized group of persons, or legal successor or representative of any of the
foregoing, and includes the United States or any agency thereof, or any other
government, or any of its political subdivisions").
4Soundview Pulp Co. v. Taylor, 21 Wash. (2d) 261, 150 P. (2d) 839 (1944).
G Case v. Bowles, 66 S. Ct. 438, 444, 90 L. ed. 560. This argument briefly
was that the words "any other government" meant co-equal national sovereign-
ties or foreign governments and that the word "states" would have been used
had congress intended the act to apply to them. For an excellent statement of
this point see Twin Falls County v. Hulbert, 156 P. (2d) 319 (Idaho 1945).
6 Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U. S. 79, 84, 60 S. Ct. 34, 37, 84 L. ed. 93,
98 (1939) ; Yonkers v. United States, 320 U. S. 685, 64 S. Ct. 327, 88 L. ed.
400 (1943).
7320 U. S. 577, 64 S. Ct. 352, 88 L. ed. 322 (1943) (the word "person"
defined by the statute as including "a corporation, partnership or association"
included a state. But cf. Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 63 S. Ct. 307, 87 L. ed.
315 (1942) (the word "person" as used in the Sherman Anti-Trust Act did not
apply to the states).
8 California v. United States, 320 U. S. 577, 585, 64 S. Ct. 352, 356, 88 L. ed.
322, 330 (1943).
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commodities charged by a state or its agencies would produce exactly
the same conditions as would be produced were these prices charged
by other persons. We, therefore, have no doubt that congress intended
the act to apply generally to.sales of commodities by states" appears to
agree.
A special doctrine of interpretation was raised by the claim that
the state acted in a "governmental" capacity in selling land to secure
money for its schools. In determining the applicability of a federal
statute to the states, especially in tax cases, the Supreme Court for
some years purported to distinguish state actioh in a "governmental"
and in a "private" capacityi ° deeming the tax collectible from the
state as to the latter. However, it refused to apply the distinction
where tariff duties were imposed on educational property imported
by a state university1 and in California v. United States to the regula-
tory power of congress over commerce and recently expressly repudi-
ated it in New Y"ork v. United States'2 calling these "untenable cri-
teria" 18 and announcing a new rule of interpretation for tax cases that
"so long as Congress generally taps a source of revenue by whomso-
ever earned and not uniquely capable of being earned by a State, the
Constitution of the United States does not forbid it merely because the
incidence falls also on a State."'14
Apparently a uniform rule of interpretation is evolving for all
cases where congressional statutes do not specifically deal with the
states. Applicability of such statutes to the states was found alike in
California v. United States, New Tork v. United States, and the in-
stant case, with resultant extension of national controls and curtail-
ment of state immunities. Resistance to this trend is still manifested,
however, in some opinions for the Court 5 and in concurrencesiO and
9 Case v. Bowles, 66 S. Ct. at 442, 90 L. ed. at 558.
1 0 Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 725, 78 L. ed. 1307 (1934);
South Carolina v. United States, 199 U. S. 437, 26 S. Ct. 110, 50 L. ed. 261
(1905).
11 University of Illinois v. United States, 289 U. S. 48, 53 S. Ct. 509, 77 L. ed.
1025 (1933).
12 New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 66 S. Ct. 310, 90 L. ed. 265
(1946).
' Id. at 583, 66 S. Ct. at 315, 90 L. ed. at 271.
". Ibid.
5 Dajvis Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 152, 64 S. Ct. 474, 479,
88 L. ed. 635, 641 (1944); Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351, 63 S. Ct. 307,
313, 87 L. ed. 315, 326 (1942).
1 0 See the concurring opinions of Mr. Justice Murphy in Penn Dairies v. Milk
Control Comm., 318 U. S. 261, 279, 63 S. Ot. 617, 625, 87 L. ed. 748 (1942),
and Mr. Justice Rutledge in New York v. United States, 326 U. S. 572, 584,
66 S. Ct. 310, 315, 90 L. ed. 265, 271 (1946).
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dissents17 so that, despite suggestions of broadened principles of inter-
pretation, there is still some prospect of success for the states in con-
tinuing to rely primarily on claims for strict interpretation of statutes.
The powers of congress as presently conceived' 8 make it much more
unlikely that the Court will hold an act unconstitutional than that it
may in a specific case apply a rule of "express application," under
which congress would be called on for express and unequivocal ref-
erence. A settled practice of that tenor on the part of congress would
in any case be desirable as relieving the Court of consideration of mat-
ters of policy not properly within its domain.' D.C. C., JR.
CASE COMMENTS
CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS-DuTY OF AGENT TO RECONVEY LAND
PURCHASED FOR PRINCIPAL-STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-Plaintiff seeks to
recover realty, formerly belonging to him, which he alleges defendant,
his brother, had bought at a judicial sale, on an oral agreement to recon-
vey to plaintiff at such time as plaintiff should be financially able to re-
deem it on payment of the purchase price plus interest. Both parties at-
tempted to suppress bidding before the sale in order that defendant might
purchase. Defendant took possession and held the property for approxi-
mately ten years after which he refused to reconvey on tender of the pur-
chase price. The circuit court entered a decree for redemption of the
realty upon payment of a sum to be fixed by an accounting. Held, that
such oral agreement was unenforceable (1) as an oral contract for the
sale of land within the Statute of Frauds, W. VA. REV. CODE (Michie,
1943) c. 36, art. 1, §3, (2) as an oral declaration of trust within the Sta-
tute of Frauds, W. VA. REv. CODE (Michie, 1943) c. 36, art. 1, §4, (3) as
not being within the permissible provisions of the statute allowing an
'7 See the dissents of Mr. Justice Murphy in Pacific Coast Dairy v. Depart-
ment of Agriculture of California, 318 U. S. 285, 303, 63 S. Ct. 628, 634, 87
L. ed. 761, 771 (1942), and Mr. Justice Roberts in California v. United States,
320 U. S. 577, 586, 64 S. Ct. 352, 357, 88 L. ed. 322, 331 (1943).
Is See e. g., Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U. S. 548, 57 S. Ct. 883, 81.
L. ed. 1279 (1937); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U. S. 111o 63 S. Ct. 82, 87 L. ed.
122 (1942); CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY (8th
ed. 1946) 42, 143.
19 See Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm., 318 U. S. 261, 275, 63 S. Ct.
617, 623, 87 L. ed. 748, 757 (1942) ("An unexpressed purpose of Congress to
set aside statutes of the states regulating their internal affairs is not lightly to be
inferred and ought not to be implied where the legislative command, read in the
light of its history, remains ambiguous . . . Court should guard against resolv-
ing these competing considerations of policy by imputing to Congress a decision
which quite clearly it has not undertaken to make"); Davis Warehouse Co. v.
Bowles, 321 U. S. 144, 152, 64 S. Ct. 474, 479, 88 L. ed. 635, 641 (1944)
("Where Congress has not clearly indicated a purpose to precipitate conflict
(between state and federal governments) we should be reluctant to do so by
decision").
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